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The cash flow, return and risk characteristics of private equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
Using a unique dataset of private equity funds over the last two decades, this paper analyzes the 
cash flow, return, and risk characteristics of private equity. Unlike previous studies, we have 
detailed cash flow data for each fund, rather than aggregate or accounting returns. We also know 
the exact timing of investments and capital returns to investors and the number and types of 
companies each fund invested in. We document the draw down and capital return schedules for 
the typical private equity fund, and show that it takes several years for capital to be invested, and 
over ten years for capital to be returned to generate excess returns. We provide several 
determining factors for these schedules, including existing investment opportunities and 
competition amongst private equity funds. In terms of performance, we document that private 
equity generates excess returns on the order of five to eight percent per annum relative to the 
aggregate public equity market. Moreover, while we estimate the betas of the private equity 
funds’ portfolios to be greater than one, we show that on a risk-adjusted basis the excess value of 
the typical private equity fund is on the order of 24 percent relative to the present value of the 
invested capital. One interpretation of this magnitude is that it represents compensation for 
holding a 10-year illiquid investment.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides the first analysis of private equity returns based on actual cash flows of 
venture capital and buyout funds. Despite the important role of private equity in financing and 
fostering innovative firms, and in reallocating capital to more productive sectors of the economy, 
relatively little is known about the key characteristics of private equity as an asset class: liquidity, 
risk, and return. Relative to other asset classes, private equity investments are illiquid, in the sense 
that there is no active secondary market for such investments, investors have little control over how 
the capital is invested, and the investment profile covers a long horizon. Our data allow us to 
document the degree of liquidity and the resulting compensation, if any, in terms of risk-adjusted 
returns provided to investors. Specifically, we empirically measure the timing and magnitude of 
investment decisions throughout the ten-year life of a fund, how quickly capital is returned to 
investors, and the overall performance of private equity as a function of various characteristics.  
Our results complement an emerging literature in finance that has looked at the returns on 
private equity. (See, for example, Cochrane (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), 
Kaplan and Schoar (2002), and Quigley and Woodward (2002), among others.) There is an 
important caveat to this literature: prior work has not had access to very precise data about private 
equity funds. In particular, rather than computing performance using the distribution of cash flows 
to and from fund investors, prior work has generally relied on fund valuation data as collected by 
Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics service. These data have three principal shortcomings: 
they are available only in aggregate rather than fund-by-fund form (but see Kaplan and Schoar for 
an important exception); the data are self-reported and thus potentially subject to selection biases; 
and they are based on unrealized as well as realized investments which introduces noise and 
potentially biases due to subjective accounting treatment. 
In contrast, we use cash flow data for a fairly large dataset of private equity funds raised over 
the period 1981 to 2001 to shed brighter light on the characteristics and performance of this asset 
class. Our dataset includes, among other items, precisely dated cash flows representing investments 
in portfolio companies, management fees, and distributions of capital gains to investors. We also 
know the portfolio compositions in terms of the number and types of companies each fund invested 
in. Using these data, we analyze the cash flow, return, and risk characteristics of private equity. 
Specifically, we ask: (i) What are the capital investment and return patterns of private equity 
throughout the life of the fund ? (ii) What determines the speed with which funds invest their capital 
over time? (iii) How long does it take for returns to turn positive? (iv) What is the risk profile of 
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private equity funds, both in terms of systematic and unsystematic risk? And (v) are private equity 
returns impressive relative to their risk profile and various benchmarks? The contribution of our 
paper is to be able to provide the first definitive answers to these questions.  
Beyond providing the first evidence of private equity returns based on actual cash flows, our 
paper generates some new stylized facts about private equity investing. First, we document the 
dynamics of both draw downs (capital investment) and capital returns over a fund’s life. These 
suggest that knowledge of the timing of actual cash outflows and inflows is an important factor in 
understanding the performance of private equity funds. For example, it takes six years for 90 
percent of the committed capital to be invested, so simplifying assumptions about immediate up 
front deployment of capital seem problematic. Moreover, we perform a cross-sectional and time-
series analysis of the determining factors of how fast or how slowly a fund invests. We empirically 
identify two key factors, namely time variation in the availability of investment opportunities and 
competition for deal flow with other private equity funds. In particular, we find that it is easy to 
invest an existing fund when it is a good time to raise a new fund. At the same time, funds take 
longer to invest when their peers have more money with which to chase the same deals.  
Second, the IRR of the average fund does not turn positive until the eighth year of the fund’s 
life. Thus, once the adjustment for the cost of capital is made, it is only at the very end of a life’s 
fund that excess returns are realized. This highlights the illiquidity of private equity investments. It 
also suggests that “interim” IRRs computed before a fund reaches maturity are not very informative. 
Measuring fund performance thus requires using precisely dated cash flows over a fund’s life, rather 
than relying on arbitrary assumptions about the time profile of capital returns. 
Third, we find that private equity has generated substantial excess returns over the past two 
decades. Specifically, for funds started between 1981 and 1993 (the “mature” funds in our dataset), 
we document internal rates of return averaging 19.81 percent, net of all fees.1 In contrast, 
investment in the public stock market measured using the S&P 500 index under an identical time 
schedule of cash outflows yields 14.1 percent. Excess returns of close to six percent per annum no 
doubt compensate investors, at least in part, for the extreme illiquidity of private equity.2 But they 
                                                           
1 Funds raised more recently are still in operation – either actively investing or seeking to exit portfolio companies via 
IPOs or trade sales – and their eventual realized returns will include losses due to the internet bust and the recent 
recession. It is conceivable that their loss rates will be higher than has been the case historically. However, the funds in 
our dataset are predominantly from the buyout sector and so are less subject to the idiosyncrasies of the internet sector. 
We address the behavior of recently raised funds in Section 6. 
2 Alternatively, one could argue that the marginal investor places a zero price on illiquidity. That is, the clientele for 
private equity may be such that investors are liquid based on their other portfolio holdings. 
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may also be a reflection of the investment skill of certain fund managers and the “closed club” 
nature of private equity investing. These results are somewhat in contrast to the aforementioned 
literature, and we evaluate the extent to which this is due to our particular sample characteristics 
versus the higher quality of our data. 
Fourth, by looking at each fund’s investments in detail, assigning industry betas to the portfolio 
companies, we are able to estimate fund risk. This is important because it is not possible to estimate 
risk at the fund level, using standard time-series correlations with the market return, as the fund’s 
investments are realized fully only after the fund has been liquidated, usually after ten years. We 
find that fund returns are still abnormally large even on a risk-adjusted basis. For example, while 
the return on invested capital (as measured by the Profitability Index) averages 25.07 percent 
assuming simplistically a beta of one with the market, it still averages 24 percent when discounting 
cash flows at the risk-adjusted cost of capital.  
Finally, we document several key characteristics of the typical private equity fund’s portfolio of 
investments, including the number of companies held, the industry concentration, and portfolio 
beta. Our private equity funds are not well diversified: on average, they invest close to 40 percent of 
their capital in a single industry. Using these risk characteristics and some other standard ones from 
the literature, we perform a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of private equity returns. 
One conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the cross-section of fund returns is unlikely to be 
explained by either the underlying systematic or unsystematic risk of the portfolio companies. The 
more important characteristics appear to be the overall amount of money flowing into the private 
equity sector as a whole (“money chasing deals”) and the size of the fund itself.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the existing 
literature on the risk and return of private equity investments. In Section 3, we describe our dataset. 
Section 4 provides the core results of the paper by documenting both the cash flow patterns of 
private equity funds and the returns on these funds over the last 20 years. Because a number of the 
funds in our dataset are still on-going concerns, special emphasis is placed on the return 
characteristics of the “mature” funds. Section 5 compares the performance of these mature funds to 
investments in public equities holding constant the time profile of investment, and adjusted for the 
risk of the underlying portfolio companies. In Section 6, we conjecture about private equity funds 
raised in the 1998-2001 period. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Existing Literature 
Given the volume of literature on venture capital, it may seem surprising that there are only a 
few papers analyzing the returns on private equity.3 The main obstacle to research has been the 
limited availability of data. 
The main sources of data on the private equity industry are two commercial data vendors, 
Venture Economics and VentureOne. These are in general excellent sources of information about 
the investment behavior of private equity funds, such as which fund invests how much in which 
company. They are not, however, ideal for investigating the performance of private equity funds.  
While Venture Economics publishes internal rates of return, it does so only at an aggregate 
level, such as for the median or third-quartile fund. Fund level data are not publicly available. 
Moreover, the Venture Economics returns represent a mixture of growth in net asset value (NAV) 
for unrealized investments and IRRs for realized investments.4 The inclusion of NAV growth rates 
in the Venture Economics data is potentially particularly misleading. Writing up a portfolio 
investment long before any actual cash distribution to investors flatters the time profile of returns 
and thus increases the accounting IRR. Of course, accounting valuations are not bankable and may 
never be followed by commensurate cash distributions. Nor are valuations subject to any type of 
generally accepted accounting principles. Thus, for the exact same investment, different private 
equity funds may assess very different values (see Blaydon and Horvath (2002)). Differences in 
accounting practices can occur for a number of reasons. For example, many private equity funds are 
conservative in their assessments and value investments at cost until the investments are realized. 
Other funds – particularly first-time funds – may be aggressive in their valuations by not writing 
down poorly performing companies or even overstating the value of ongoing ones, especially in 
difficult times (see Gompers (1996) and Blaydon, Horvath, and Wainwright (2002)). These 
differences in assessed values induce little confidence in the reported values and IRRs of private 
equity funds (Gompers and Lerner (1997)).  
Four recent papers have attempted to quantify the returns and risk of private equity. (See 
Cochrane (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Kaplan and Schoar (2002), and 
                                                           
3 There is an extensive literature on the role of venture capital in financial markets, including the relation between 
venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and public markets. See, for example, Gompers and Lerner (1999) for an extensive 
discussion. 
4 As funds near their liquidation date, the weight of NAV growth rates in the calculation of performance measures 
declines. However, unless IRRs are calculated using precisely dated cash flows, reported IRRs may still overstate or 
understate performance. We are told that many funds make simplifying assumptions about the timing of cash flows 
when reporting IRRs.  
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Quigley and Woodward (2002)). The general conclusion from these papers regarding private equity 
performance is mixed and these differences can be partly attributed to the quality of the data. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2002) have exclusive access to the (albeit anonymized) fund-by-fund data 
from which Venture Economics derive their published aggregate private equity performance data. 
This is a valuable improvement on the use of aggregated data, though the fund-by-fund return data 
remain subject to the limitations of self-reporting and accounting treatment noted earlier. These 
limitations can create substantial variation at the individual fund level which Kaplan and Schoar, to 
their credit, fully acknowledge. To this point, Kaplan and Schoar document large heterogeneity in 
performance across funds. These excess returns, however, do not take into account the timing of the 
cash flows (which is not available) or the risk profile of the portfolio companies (due to anonymity). 
This caveat is potentially important as we document later that the draw down and capital return 
schedules and portfolio risks take on complex patterns which, in turn, affect performance estimates. 
Most importantly, realizations of investment returns do not take place until very late in the life of 
the funds. Kaplan and Schoar’s analysis does, however, have the significant advantage of including 
a large cross-section, and they present evidence suggesting performance is affected by a number of 
important characteristics not looked at here, such as the ability to raise follow-on funds.  
As an alternative strategy, Cochrane (2000) and Quigley and Woodward (2002) focus on the 
individual portfolio company (rather than fund) level, and then, using various assumptions, infer the 
aggregate performance of private equity investing. These papers are important and document 
interesting facts about private equity investments. Cochrane stresses the importance of adjusting for 
survivorship bias, which potentially arises due to the high failure rate of private equity investments. 
Unfortunately, the Venture One data used there do not permit controlling for the timing of the cash 
flows to and from the portfolio companies, nor the actual dollar realization of the investments when 
taken public or sold – limitations the authors acknowledge. Assigning valuations to about three 
quarters of IPOs and one quarter of acquired companies using Thomson Financial SDC’s new 
issues and M&A databases, Cochrane finds that mean log returns of individual portfolio 
investments are around five percent, with slightly negative alphas, though arithmetic returns are 
much higher. Using different assumptions, Quigley and Woodward (2002) report lower returns for 
private than for public equity.  
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) similarly report that returns to private equity mostly 
fall short of those in the public equity market. Their analysis focuses on a broadly-defined notion of 
private equity, with data derived from the Survey of Consumer Finances and various national 
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income accounts. Thus, their results pertain mostly to non-intermediated (entrepreneurial) 
investments in non-public companies, as opposed to intermediated investments undertaken by 
private equity funds.  
Our paper avoids these problems by using data on both the exact timing of the investments and 
distribution of cash flows to investors, and the types of companies contained in each fund’s 
portfolio. The drawback of our approach is the relatively limited sample size. However, the only 
previous paper to have access to similar data, Gompers and Lerner (1997), looked at just one fund.5 
In the next section, we describe the dataset and its characteristics in more detail. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Overview of Dataset 
Our dataset is derived from the records of one of the largest institutional investors in private 
equity in the U.S. We will refer to this investor as the “Limited Partner”. As a condition for 
obtaining the data, we have agreed to identify neither the Limited Partner nor the names of the 
funds or portfolio companies in the dataset. Of particular interest, these data are not subject to 
survivorship bias as all investments the Limited Partner has made since 1981 are included.  
Between 1981 and 1993, the Limited Partner invested in 73 funds. These funds – which we will 
refer to as the “mature” funds since they are around ten or more years old – form the basis for our 
performance analysis. The Limited Partner has continued to invest in a large number of private 
equity funds since 1993, but to protect the Limited Partner’s identity, we have agreed not to disclose 
certain characteristics of the funds raised after 1993, such as their number and size. We do, 
however, include the underlying cash flow data for such funds in our analysis where appropriate.  
Private equity firms (often called “general partners” or GPs), when successful, usually raise 
follow-on funds. In our dataset, 28.9 percent of funds are first-time funds, 20.6 percent are second 
funds, 11.6 percent are third funds, and the remaining 39.0 percent are later funds.  
The extent to which the funds in our dataset are representative of the universe of private equity 
funds depends on the Limited Partner’s investment strategy. For instance, it would be problematic if 
the Limited Partner only invested in follow-on funds raised by venture capitalists with proven track 
records. This is not the case. In part, this is because the Limited Partner’s investment objectives are 
twofold: not only to obtain the highest risk-adjusted return, but also to increase the likelihood that 
                                                           
5 Interestingly, for the particular fund in their sample, Gompers and Lerner (1997) also report excess returns relative to 
public equity.  
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the funds will “purchase” the services our Limited Partner’s corporate parent has to offer. These 
services are arguably more attractive to first-time funds that have yet to build up relationships, thus 
the relatively high rate of first-time funds in our dataset. This issue of sample selection is further 
studied in Section 4.5. 
We are able to match all but eight of the sample funds to funds covered in Venture Economics. 
This allows us to augment the information we received from the Limited Partner with publicly 
available information. 91.1 percent of the funds are based in the U.S., 7.4 percent in Europe, and 1.5 
percent in Latin America. Within the U.S., funds are geographically concentrated: 58 percent of 
funds are headquartered in California or New York, 10 percent in Massachusetts, 6.7 percent in 
Texas, and the remainder in 11 other states.  
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the sample and of several descriptive statistics by the year in 
which the funds were raised (the “vintage years”). For comparison, the table also shows the total 
number of new funds raised in each year, according to Venture Economics, by partnerships 
headquartered in the countries that our sample funds are located in. Every year between 1992 and 
2000 saw more funds raised than the previous year, with particularly large numbers raised at the 
height of the internet frenzy in 1999 and 2000. Although we cannot show this in detail, the number 
of funds the Limited Partner invested in similarly increased throughout the 1990s, peaking in 1999-
2000.  
Our dataset contains both venture capital and private equity funds.6 For the entire period from 
1981 to 2001, a quarter of funds, representing 14.8 percent of fund capital, are venture funds. This 
differs from the universe of funds tracked by Venture Economics, where venture funds account for 
74.6 percent of funds by number and 41.5 percent by capital. Our Limited Partner thus invests 
disproportionately in private equity (primarily buyout) funds. In the 1981-1993 sample of “mature” 
funds, this pattern is even more pronounced: private equity funds account for 74 percent of funds by 
number and 88.2 percent by capital. 
In the private equity industry, fund size is usually expressed as the sum of investors’ “capital 
commitments.” The capital commitment is the maximum amount of money an investor can be asked 
to contribute over the life of the fund. Note that when agreeing to invest in a fund, investors do not 
transfer the committed cash up front. Instead, general partners “draw down” cash against the 
                                                           
6 Private equity funds are mainly those flagged as “Buyout” (90.4 percent) by Venture Economics (or the Limited 
Partner, if not covered by Venture Economics). The remainder are flagged as “Generalist Private Equity” (3.8 percent), 
“Mezzanine” (4.8 percent), and “Other Private Equity” (1 percent).  
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commitment whenever they wish to make an investment. The rate at which cash is invested clearly 
affects the IRR the fund achieves.  
Sample funds started between 1981 and 2001 had aggregate commitments of $207 billion (in 
nominal terms), as compared to $1.184 trillion in the Venture Economics universe over the same 
period (not shown). Thus, while we only have data for a relative small number of the 8,539 funds 
raised over the period, our funds account for a disproportionately large fraction – 17.5 percent – of 
capital commitments. Our coverage is even better among non-venture funds: we have data for 9.5 
percent of all non-venture funds raised over the period, accounting for 29.3 percent of committed 
capital in those funds.  
The 73 mature funds started between 1981 and 1993 had aggregate commitments of $36.7 
billion, with the average find raising $502.8 million. Our Limited Partner’s investment in these 
funds is sizeable. It committed $1.1 billion in aggregate, with an average of $15.2 million per fund 
and a range between $800,000 and $167.4 million. As a fraction of total fund size, the Limited 
Partner committed 4.64 percent of the average mature fund’s capital.  
 
3.2 Cash Flows and Stock Distributions 
The Limited Partner made available to us the complete cash flow records for all its private 
equity investments up to May 31, 2001. We subsequently obtained additional data up to September 
30, 2002 for 21 funds that were close to maturity, thus increasing the number of funds that have 
been liquidated or are close to liquidation.  
There are essentially three types of cash flows: cash flows associated with “disbursements” 
(investments in portfolio companies) and “exits” (receipt of cash inflows from IPOs or trade sales) 
as well as (occasionally) dividends paid by portfolio companies; annual management fees (typically 
1-2 percent of committed capital); and (occasional) interest payments on cash held by the GP prior 
to making an investment. The data do not separately record the GPs’ share in a fund’s capital gains 
(usually 20 percent), called the “carried interest” or “carry”, as GPs transmit capital gains to 
investors net of their carry.  
The cash flows involve four types of investment scenarios. 1) Cancelled transactions: a cash call 
followed shortly after by the return of the cash, along with bank interest. 2) Write-offs: cash 
outflow(s) without subsequent cash inflow, or with a subsequent accounting (non-cash) entry 
flagging a “capital loss”. 3) Cash distributions following successful exits (in the form of an IPO or a 
trade sale): cash outflow(s) followed by cash inflow(s). And 4), stock distributions following 
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successful exits: cash outflow(s) followed by a non-cash entry reflecting receipt of common stock. 
The stock would be the portfolio company’s in the case of an IPO, and the buyer’s in the case of a 
sale to a publicly traded firm. Following a stock distribution, one of two things can happen: the 
Limited Partner sells the stock, or it holds it in inventory. Sales show up as cash inflows. Positions 
that are held in inventory are marked to market periodically (usually monthly), but they are 
obviously not cash. 
Given our focus on cash IRRs, stock distributions warrant special attention. Fortunately, they 
are relatively rare. Fewer than 20 percent of sample funds engage in stock distributions, so most 
funds distribute cash. However, this statement suffers from right-censoring, as many younger funds 
haven’t yet started distributing anything. Among the 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993, 31 
have distributed stock.  
There are 203 stock distributions in our dataset, involving 171 portfolio companies. (We 
estimate that there are more than 4,300 portfolio companies in our dataset of which more than 900 
have been exited.) Upon receipt of distributed stock, our Limited Partner almost always sells 
distributed stock: there are only seven (mostly recent) cases where it has yet to sell or sell 
completely. Thus, we do have an objective cash valuation for virtually all stock distributions. 
However, the Limited Partner does not typically sell immediately. In only 65 cases does it sell 
within 60 days, and the average (median) time between receipt of the stock distribution and the last 
sale associated with that distribution is 245 (110) days.7 
For performance evaluation purposes, we “book” cash inflows from the sale of distributed stock 
on the Limited Partner’s actual transaction days. To the extent that our Limited Partner follows a 
different sale policy and time profile than other fund investors, its realized return from investing in a 
fund may therefore not be entirely representative. Alternatively, one might simulate the 
performance of a policy of selling distributed stock automatically upon receipt. However, we do not 
know the number of shares the Limited Partner received in the stock distributions, so we cannot 
estimate their market value on the distribution dates.  
Potentially problematic are the cases where the Limited Partner still has unsold stock, since our 
focus on cash flows implies that we value stock held in inventory at zero. Luckily, there is only one 
such case among the “mature” funds that we focus on in our performance analysis. In this case, we 
                                                           
7 This holding period is a maximum, as positions are often unwound in multiple transactions. 
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obtain the Limited Partner’s marked-to-market valuation and pretend it sold the position at this 
price.  
 
4. The Cash Flow and Return Characteristics of Private Equity Funds 
4.1 Cash Flow Patterns: Draw-downs 
In evaluating the returns on private equity funds, it is common to take the capital commitment as 
being invested on an immediate basis.8 To the extent this is not the case, excess returns will be 
misstated for two reasons. First, the timing of the cash outflows clearly affects the return via the 
time value of money. The bias will necessarily be towards an understatement of the return. Second, 
the risk of the investment should reflect the period over which the capital is invested.  
In fact, fund managers typically only draw down the limited partners’ capital commitment when 
they are ready to invest in a portfolio company. Table 2 shows how much of the commitment was 
drawn down by the earlier of the end of our sampling period or a fund’s liquidation date. The 
average fund in our sample had drawn down 67.3 percent of committed capital. However, this 
understates draw downs as the more recent funds are not yet fully invested. The 59 (73) funds raised 
between 1981 and 1992 (1993) invested on average 94.8 (94.7) percent of committed capital. 
Average draw downs are around 90 percent of committed capital for funds raised up to 1996, with 
later vintages still actively investing and so still in what is called the “commitment period”.  
It is arguable when a fund is fully invested. Among the funds raised between 1981 and 1993 that 
have subsequently been liquidated, some never invested more than 60-70 percent of committed 
capital. In the overall 1981-2001 dataset, 55.6 percent of funds have invested at least 70 percent of 
committed capital, and 49.5 percent have invested 80 percent or more as of the end of our sampling 
period. These might reasonably be thought of as fully, or close to fully, invested. They include a 
few very recent funds that invested their committed capital very rapidly: 40 percent of the 1998 
vintage funds and 10 percent of the 1999 vintage funds had already invested at least 70 percent of 
committed capital by May 2001. 
While the magnitude of the cash outflows (i.e., the investment draw downs and the annual 
management fees) is clearly a key component for measuring a fund’s return, the timing of these 
outflows is also important for the reasons stated earlier. Table 3 sheds light on the time profile. 
Funds are typically (but not always) ten-year limited partnerships, with possible extensions by a few 
                                                           
8 For instance, Venture Economics’ “TVPI” measure, used in Kaplan and Schoar (2002), is defined as total cash 
returned over total cash invested, without discounting.  
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years subject to investor approval. The table shows average annual and cumulative draw downs for 
each year of a fund’s life (counted from 1 to 10). The average fund draws down 16.28, 20.35, and 
20.15 percent of committed capital in its first three years of operation, so it is 56.8 percent invested 
by the end of year 3. The draw down rate then slows down. In fact, it takes another three years to hit 
a 90 percent rate. By year 10, the end of its expected life, the average fund is 93.6 percent invested. 
While some funds remain in operation beyond year 10, there are no further draw downs.  
Though not shown in the table, there is wide variation in the speed with which funds draw down 
committed capital. For instance, some funds draw it down immediately, while others take as long as 
ten years to invest 80 percent or more of their commitments. Adjusting for the fact that many of the 
more recent funds are right-censored, in that they drop out of our sample before they are fully 
invested, the average (median) fund takes 3.69 (4) years to invest 80 percent or more of their 
commitments.  
 
4.2 The Determinants of Draw-downs 
To shed light on the determinants of how quickly a fund invests its capital, we model the time-
to-fully-invested as ln(ti) = βX + ln(εi), where the error εi is assumed to follow the exponential 
distribution with mean β0. This is a standard accelerated-failure model (which can easily be 
rewritten as a proportional-hazard duration model), so the likelihood function has no problem 
correcting for the right-censoring inherent in the data (Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)). Therefore, 
we can estimate the model using all sample funds raised between 1981 and 2001. We conjecture 
that time-to-fully-invested varies with the (time-varying) availability of investment opportunities, 
competition for such investment opportunities, and the cost of funds. We also allow for potential 
differences between venture and buyout funds, first-time and follow-on funds, and older and more 
recent funds. Finally, we estimate whether larger funds take longer to invest.  
To proxy for the unobserved availability of investment opportunities faced by a buyout 
(venture) fund in our sample, we include the annual inflows into new buyout (venture) funds 
(measured as the log of the real dollars raised, in March 1996 purchasing power). This assumes that 
new funds raise more capital, the more profitable investment opportunities are available. Note that 
this variable is time-varying: as inflows into new funds change over the life of a sample fund, the 
fund’s managers can respond by accelerating or decelerating the rate at which they invest. In 
addition, we include a dummy that equals one during the dotcom bubble (1999-2000), on the 
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assumption that investment opportunities were more abundant in those years. Again, this is a time-
varying covariate: over the fund’s life, it equals one only in 1999-2000. 
To proxy for the degree of competition faced by a buyout (venture) fund in our sample, we 
include the (log of the real) amount of capital committed to buyout (venture) funds in the year the 
sample fund was raised. That is, a 1990 vintage fund is assumed to be competing with other funds 
of that vintage. This is clearly a noisy measure of competition. Note that this variable is not time-
varying. Finally, we use two measures of the cost of funds: the yield on corporate bonds, using 
Moody’s BAA bond index estimated annually in December, and the annual return on the S&P 500 
Index. Both are time-varying over the life of a sample fund. 
Table 4 reports the maximum-likelihood estimation results for three different cut-offs of “fully-
invested” (more than 70, 80, or 90 percent of committed capital).9 The results are qualitatively 
similar in each case. While venture funds take longer to invest than buyout funds, the difference is 
only marginally significant. First-time funds invest somewhat faster, but this is not significant at 
conventional levels. Funds raised between 1981 and 1993, on the other hand, invest significantly 
faster than newer funds. Note that this finding is not driven by the fact that many newer funds drop 
out of our sample before becoming fully invested, as we have corrected for right-censoring. We find 
no evidence that fund size affects the investment rate. 
Our proxy for the availability of investment opportunities – the time-varying log of real fund 
inflows – has a strongly negative and significant effect on the time-to-fully-invested. This makes 
economic sense: times when it is easy to invest an existing fund are also good times to raise a new 
fund. The dummy for the bubble years 1999-2000 tells a similar story: funds are invested 
significantly faster in those two years. Our proxy for competition – the total capital raised in the 
fund’s vintage year – has a positive and significant effect. This suggests that funds take longer to 
invest when their peers have more money with which to chase the same deals. Finally, the 
coefficient estimated for the corporate bond yield is positive and significant, indicating that funds 
invest more slowly as debt becomes more expensive. This is likely driven by the leverage needs of 
our buyout funds. The return on the S&P 500, on the other hand, has no significant effect. In other 
words, what happens in the public markets does not appear to affect the speed with which private 
equity funds deploy their committed capital.  
                                                           
9 As mentioned in the previous sub-section, a small number of the mature funds never invested more than 60-70 percent 
of their capital. For these, we measure time-to-fully invested as the number of years until they reached their maximum 
draw down. 
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Overall, all three specifications have good fit, as indicated by the significance of the likelihood 
ratio tests. We obtain the highest pseudo-R2, at 27.7 percent, in the specification that defines fully-
invested as 80 percent or more of committed capital. 
 
4.3 Cash Flow Patterns: Distributions 
Draw downs represent just one aspect of a fund’s cash flows. The other is the return of capital, 
and capital gains, to investors. Following liquidity events (such as an IPO), capital is returned to 
investors in the form of cash distributions or stock distributions. (Private equity funds typically have 
covenants restricting reinvestment of capital gains; see Gompers and Lerner (1996).) Distributions 
are net of the general partners’ “carried interest”, that is, the share in any capital gains (usually 20 
percent) that accrues to GPs and that constitutes the bulk of their compensation. We again comment 
on both the magnitude and timing of these cash flows. 
Table 2 shows how much of the invested and committed capital was returned to investors by the 
earlier of the end of our sampling period or a fund’s liquidation date. The average fund distributed 
106.8 percent of drawn-down capital and 94.3 percent of committed capital. Again, this understates 
cash flows as recent funds have yet to exit many of their portfolio holdings. The 59 (73) funds 
raised between 1981 and 1992 (1993) returned 2.75 (2.59) times invested capital and 2.61 (2.44) 
times committed capital, on average. 
As in the case of draw downs, it is also important to consider the timing of these distributions. 
Table 3 documents the rate at which capital returns and capital gains are distributed to investors. 
Several observations are in order. First, as one might expect, distributions are rare in the early fund 
years. For example, by the end of year 3, only 16.6 percent and 12.9 percent of total invested capital 
and total committed capital have been distributed, respectively. Second, it takes a little under seven 
years for total invested capital to be returned in the average fund, and around seven years for 
committed capital to be returned. Much of the “capital gain” is thus generated from year 7 onwards. 
By year 10, the average fund has distributed 2.07 times its invested capital and 1.93 times its 
committed capital. Third, 52 funds experience further capital distributions beyond year 10, either 
because they remain in operation or due to a prolonged liquidation phase. By the time they are 
eventually liquidated, the 60 funds with 10 or more years of data have returned 2.78 times their 
invested capital and 2.62 times their committed capital, on average. It is important to note, 
therefore, that there is considerable payoff from private equity investments even after 10 years of 
operation. 
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In conclusion, draw downs (cash outflows) and distributions (cash inflows) are the raw inputs 
when assessing fund performance, but there is another ingredient: the time profile of cash flows. 
The later the cash outflows, and the sooner the cash inflows, the better is a fund’s performance. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that these cash flows occur throughout the life of the fund and thus must be 
taken into account at the time they occur when calculating a fund’s return. 
 
4.4 The Returns of Private Equity Funds 
Our primary measure of a fund’s return over its life is the internal rate of return on invested 
capital, taking into account the exact time profile of investments and distributions. IRRs are net of 
carried interest and management fees and so represent actual returns to the Limited Partner. As a 
rule, capital gains are not reinvested in the fund, making the calculation straightforward. 
We only count cash events (cash flows into and from portfolio companies and annual 
management fees) and ignore unrealized capital gains (including stock distributions held in 
inventory) or capital losses. Thus, our IRRs differ from those reported in aggregate form by Venture 
Economics (and used in prior studies) which represent a mixture of growth in net asset value (NAV) 
for unrealized investments and cash IRRs for realized investments.  
Internal rates of return are calculated to the earlier of the fund’s liquidation date or the last data 
entry (5/31/2001 for most funds, 9/30/2002 for some funds nearing maturity). As we will show, 
IRRs change over the life of a fund. Clearly, we have final IRRs only for liquidated funds. For 
funds that have completed their commitment period (are fully invested) but have not yet been 
liquidated, the IRR we compute is a lower bound on the eventual return: future successful exits can 
only increase the IRR.10 For funds that are still actively investing, future IRRs could move up or 
down. IRRs cannot be computed for funds that have yet to experience any positive cash flows. 
Table 5 presents IRRs broken down by vintage year. We report both average and size-weighted 
IRRs, alongside the standard deviation and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile returns. In Panel A, 
we show IRRs for all 1981-2001 funds for which IRRs can be calculated. This mixes liquidated 
funds with funds still in operation. The average cash IRR is –14.6 percent, or –30.8 percent value-
weighted, with a standard deviation of 60.3 percent. The median fund loses 3.7 percent. By 
construction, these IRRs are vastly understated as future distributions are given a value of zero. 
                                                           
10 This ignores future management fees. In the absence of additional exits, management fees will reduce the IRR. 
However, most funds charge a lower management fee after the commitment period, so the effect is small.  
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To rectify this problem, in Panel B, we show IRRs for all vintage years between 1981 and 1993 
(that is, the mature funds).11 The returns on private equity funds are high over this period (ignoring 
risk for the moment). In particular, the 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993 experienced IRRs of 
19.8 percent on average, with 18.7 percent for the median fund. Interestingly, the value-weighted 
average of 18.1 percent indicates that smaller funds performed somewhat better than larger ones.  
Across the funds, the heterogeneity of returns is much lower than previously documented (see 
Kaplan and Schoar (2002) and – albeit at the individual investment level – Cochrane (2000)). For 
example, the standard deviation is 22.3 percent, with the first and third quartile funds returning 9.9 
and 28.6 percent, respectively. As we will show, these funds are not anywhere near as diversified as 
aggregate market indices, so the consistency of their returns seems impressive. If we were willing to 
make the (rather dubious) assumption that the fund returns are cross-sectionally i.i.d., then the 
results extrapolate to volatility risk on the order of the aggregate market and Sharpe Ratios close to 
one. 
One particular advantage of our analysis is that we know the exact timing of the cash flows in 
calculating the fund returns. Venture Economics reports a performance measure that is also 
(potentially) based on cash flows, but that does not take into account the time value of money. This 
measure, called TVPI, equals cash distributions over invested capital minus one. It is the main 
performance measure used by Kaplan and Schoar (2002). The difference between our findings and 
Kaplan and Schoar’s, both in magnitude and cross-sectional variation, may in part be related to the 
lack of discounting in the Venture Economics data. As a test of this conjecture, we estimate the 
correlation between our IRRs and TVPIs for the 73 mature funds in our sample. The correlation 
coefficient is only 0.59 which shows that the ranking of fund performance would be different under 
the two measures. The timing of the cash flows is thus an important factor that needs to be taken 
into account.  
An additional concern is the fact that Venture Economics’ TVPI (and IRR) data uses subjective 
net asset values provided by the funds themselves to value unrealized investments. For example, 
funds might report a projected value for an investment, its book value, or treat it as zero. The latter 
is equivalent to our IRR calculation for non-distributed investments for the “on-going funds” raised 
between 1994 and 2001. As one can see from Table 5, if returns were calculated by mixing 
                                                           
11 The 1993 vintage funds have operated for just under ten years, so it is arguable whether they should be considered 
mature quite yet. However, excluding them does not materially change the performance estimates: the 59 funds raised 
between 1981 and 1992 returned about the same as the 1981-1993 cohort. To the extent that the 1993 vintage will earn 
further capital gains in the future, our performance estimates are conservative. 
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“mature” and “on-going” funds, one could reach quite different conclusions. Kaplan and Schoar’s 
(2002) main analysis is based on TVPIs estimated in year 5 of a fund’s life, and so combine cash 
with accounting data. We have accounting valuations for 28 of the 73 mature funds. Comparing 
their five-year TVPIs to their eventual IRRs at the end of their lives, we find a correlation of only 
0.41.  
Small sample problems aside, the performance of funds started in the early to mid 1980s seems 
to have been better than those raised in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This could be true for a 
number of reasons, not least randomness. Note though that there was a large surge in both the 
number of funds and amount of dollars raised in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Table 1). This difference 
in performance is, therefore, consistent with Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) article on “money 
chasing deals”. Related to this point, the early 1980s may have represented fundamental excess 
profit opportunities both in the venture capital sector (via the development of the personal 
computer) and the buyout sector (via corporate waste in the 1970s). For this to be true, of course, 
one would have to argue that the private equity sector was an under-represented asset class. 
Alternatively, perhaps the difference in returns reflects aggregate market movements during this 
period. We return to the potential effect of these characteristics in the next section. 
Finally, in Panel C of Table 5, we report IRRs for funds raised after 1993. IRRs are negative, 
averaging –34.1 percent (VW: –45.6 percent). On the one hand, this is not surprising: these funds 
may not yet be fully invested, and if they are, may not yet have had a chance to exit many of their 
portfolio companies. On the other hand, given the frothy state of the IPO market in 1998-2000 and 
the much documented decline in the age of IPO issuers (Loughran and Ritter (2002); Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003)), we might have expected at least some of these funds to have experienced 
significant early exit events, especially on the venture capital side. In Section 6, we provide 
evidence consistent with these conjectures. 
How does the IRR of a typical private equity fund evolve over the fund’s lifetime? Table 6 
presents fund performance by year since a fund was raised. We ask, what is the IRRT on the average 
fund in year T of its life, based on the cash flows up to T. The number of funds for which we can 
calculate IRRT varies from year to year, increasing initially as more funds experience positive cash 
flows allowing an IRR to be computed, and then decreasing as funds of more recent vintages drop 
out for lack of data.  
Table 6 reveals three novel stylized facts. First, and not surprisingly given the timing of 
outflows and inflows, average, value-weighted, and median IRRs increase with fund life. IRRs start 
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out negative, averaging –84.1 per cent in year 1, and increase monotonically as more portfolio 
companies are exited. Second, note that it takes almost until year 8 for average and median IRRs to 
turn positive. Value-weighted IRRs do not turn positive until year 9. Since the cost of capital is 
clearly not zero, excess returns – the difference between the IRR and the cost of capital – are not 
realized until even later. Third, and to this point, even by year 10 the exit process is still not 
complete: while the IRR of the cash flows received up to year 10 is 16.5 percent, post-year 10 cash 
flows eventually increase the IRR to 21.4 percent on average.  
 
4.5 Sample Selection 
      A reasonable issue with respect to the results of Sections 4.1 to 4.4 is the degree to which they 
represent the private equity fund industry as a whole. There are several ways to address this sample 
selection question. First, one could compare the makeup of our sample to the universe of funds. In 
Section 3.1, we showed that our sample was skewed towards non-venture funds, i.e., buyout funds 
and the like. For example, whereas the universe of funds represents three-quarters venture funds, 
our sample is the opposite in that it represents three-quarters buyout funds. Moreover, while we 
have data on only a small fraction of the universe of funds, our funds account for 17.5 percent of 
total capital commitments, and 29.3 percent of buyout capital commitments. Thus, our sample 
represents a reasonable cross-section of large buyout funds and a much smaller cross-section of 
venture funds. This does not mean that the characteristics above cannot be applied generally to all 
private equity funds, only that there must be the caveat that any differences in either investment or 
performance patterns between these groups will not be captured. 
Second, we could bring evidence to bear on this issue by comparing equivalent measures from 
both samples.12 For example, Kaplan and Schoar (2002) report average performance data for the 
population of funds in Venture Economics, by vintage year and in aggregate, using the TVPI 
measure. Restricting the sample to mature funds (i.e., 1981-1993) leaves them with 692 funds and a 
TVPI of 2.24. In contrast, in our sample of 73 (albeit larger) funds, TVPI averages 2.59. A t-test of 
the difference, however, is not significant at conventional levels (i.e., a p-value of 0.10). 
Nevertheless, by vintage year, our sample outperforms the Venture Economics population in eight 
of the eleven years. Thus, there is some support for our sample of primarily larger buyout funds 
outperforming the Venture Economics universe. Of course, an important caveat is our earlier point, 
                                                           
12 We thank Steve Kaplan for this suggestion. 
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made in Section 4.4 above, that the correlation between the fund’s actual return and this Venture 
Economics ratio is tenuous at best.  
Third, and finally, as in all studies with limited samples, there is the question of selection bias. 
There are two possibilities here. The first is that the Limited Partner had extraordinary fund-picking 
ability. We tend to discount this theory. As described in Section 3.1, the Limited Partner’s primary 
motivation for investing in these funds was to build relationships for the benefit of its corporate 
parent. This somewhat explains the skewness towards larger buyout funds as these are more likely 
to provide benefits on the relationship front. Moreover, the Limited Partner itself does not have the 
setup one might normally observe in a professional fund-picking (“fund-of-funds”) organization. 
The second possibility is that the Limited Partner survived these past 20 years and so we are 
perhaps looking at an exceptional Limited Partner in that sense. This point is also not particularly 
relevant as investing in private equity accounts only for a small part of the Limited Partner’s overall 
business.  
What is true, however, is that the private equity industry has survived these past 20 years, and 
the Limited Partner has been part of this process. Therefore, the results documented in this paper, 
and elsewhere, may have more to say about the historical performance of private equity than having 
any predictive content per se. That is, this asset class as a whole is a survivor, and it survived 
because of ex post good draws.13  
 
5. The Relative Performance of Private Equity Funds 
5.1 Measuring Relative Performance 
In this section, we use two methods for measuring the relative performance of private equity 
funds. Our first method measures excess IRRs, that is, the difference between a fund’s IRR and the 
return on the public equity market. At its simplest, we take as the market return the IRR of investing 
in an index at the time a fund is raised, and selling at the end of year 10. In some sense, however, 
this is an apples and oranges comparison. Fund IRRs appropriately give weight to the timing of the 
cash flows. This includes the fact that it takes many years for committed capital actually to be 
invested. A like-with-like comparison requires holding constant the time profile of the investment. 
Thus, we aim to compare investing a total of one dollar in a private equity fund, spread out over the 
fund’s life, to investing a total of one dollar in the market index, spread out in the same way and 
                                                           
13 This recalls the point made in a different context about the size of the equity risk premium in the U.S. stock market 
relative to other countries (see, for example, Goetzmann and Jorion (1999)). 
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held until the end of the private equity fund’s life. In this way, we compare returns over both 
roughly equivalent time periods and with similar durations. We consider two different draw down 
schedules (the average fund’s, as reported in Table 3, and each fund’s actual schedule) as well as 
two alternative “exit” valuations for the public equity investment strategy (selling at the end of year 
10, or at the average index value during year 10). We also consider two possible public equity 
indices, the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite Index. 
There are two potential problems with the excess IRR measure. First, as Table 3 documents, 
many funds distribute capital prior to their liquidation. IRR calculations implicitly assume that these 
early distributions can be reinvested at the fund’s IRR. This might be a reasonable assumption in 
our case, given the Limited Partner’s multiple and ongoing investments in this asset class, but it will 
tend to attenuate the differences (both negative and positive) in relative performance.14 Second, IRR 
calculations assume one discount rate for all cash flows. One can reasonably argue that outflows 
(i.e., investments) should be discounted at a different, and lower, rate than inflows. If so, IRRs will 
tend to overstate the performance of the fund relative to the true risk profile of the cash flows. 
An alternative measure that addresses these concerns is to calculate the ex post net present value 
(NPV) of investing in a fund, using the realized cash flows discounted at the risk-free rate for 
outflows and the cost of capital for inflows. As a first pass, we use the Treasury-bond rate with 
corresponding maturity for the outflows, and the expected return on the aggregate market for the 
inflows. The NPVs are scaled by the present value of the investment, giving the so-called 
Profitability Index. Intuitively, the Profitability Index can be thought of as the present-valued return 
on invested capital, that is, the excess value created for each dollar invested. Thus $1 invested in 
private equity is worth one plus the Profitability Index in present value terms. 
Table 7 presents the distribution of the excess IRRs and the Profitability Indices, relative to 
various benchmarks, for the mature funds raised between 1981 and 1993. Consider first the IRR 
calculations given in Panel A. Private equity generates positive excess returns relative to public 
equity irrespective of the assumptions underlying the draw down schedule or market benchmark. 
For example, assuming all the funds are invested immediately in the S&P 500, private equity 
produces 8.06 percent mean and 6.04 percent median excess returns on an annualized basis. While 
the Nasdaq benchmark reduces the relative magnitudes of these returns, the numbers are still 
impressive, with a 6.28 percent mean and 4.01 percent median excess return. 
                                                           
14 Intuitively, one might consider this a comparison between two long-term investment strategies, one in private versus 
the other in public equity. 
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Moving across the different draw down schedules, from the aforementioned immediate 
investment strategy to average draw downs to the fund’s actual draw downs, excess returns decline, 
both on average and for the first quartile, median, and third quartile fund. This reduction in excess 
returns implies that the funds either have market timing ability, or, alternatively, make investments 
that perform in unison with the aggregate market. However, excess returns remain substantial, 
averaging at least 5.71 percent per annum. 
Table 7, Panel B presents the distribution of the Profitability Index for the two benchmark 
indices. With respect to the S&P 500, the mean and median values are 25.07 percent and 12.18 
percent, respectively. Thus, assuming the cost of capital is the S&P 500’s average return over the 
fund’s life, private equity funds create 25 cents in excess value for every dollar invested, in present 
value terms. Part of the 25 cents reflects, of course, the cost of liquidity. Since the NPV correctly 
takes into account the timing of cash flows and the different discount rates for inflows versus 
outflows, the 25 percent estimate may be more reflective of the excess value to private equity than 
the excess IRR measures reported in Panel A. 
The fact that the median Profitability Index estimate is so far below the mean suggests that there 
is a fair amount of skewness in the distribution of possible values. In fact, the distribution suggests 
there is a significant downside in the form of funds performing poorly on a relative basis. For 
example, first-quartile funds lost 23.65 percent or more relative to an investment in the S&P 500.  
Finally we note that using Nasdaq-based discount rates reduces the mean excess value to only 
9.96 percent, with an even larger degree of cross-sectional variation across funds. The median 
excess value, for example, is now negative. The differences here are sufficiently large to explore the 
funds’ risk characteristics in order to better understand which cost of capital is appropriate.  
 
5.2 The Risk of Private Equity Funds 
In Section 5.1, we compared the returns on private equity to a similar investment in the 
aggregate public equity market. Ideally, we would like to adjust for any systematic risk differences 
between the private equity funds and the aggregate market. This is nontrivial because of the lack of 
any meaningful time series. At first glance, this may seem surprising given our 20 years of data. 
Previous analyses, such as Kaplan and Schoar (2002), have looked at the covariation between a 
fund’s returns (as reported to Venture Economics) and the market return. Our empirical results 
above suggest this is probably not a valid approach. Note that the returns on the fund investments 
do not actually get realized until years 9 to 10. Thus, reasonably, the only measurable return is over 
  
21 
 
a 10-year horizon. This leaves us with only two truly independent observations on the market return 
and thus time-series measures of betas are inappropriate. A sensible alternative is to somehow 
extract the information cross-sectionally. 
One obvious cross-sectional distinction is whether the fund is a venture or non-venture (i.e. 
buyout) fund. Both the nature of the companies invested in and the degree of leverage are different 
enough for these types of funds that this distinction might be an important determinant of cross-
sectional variation in fund performance. Thus, as a first pass, we break down the IRR results of 
Tables 5 and 6 into venture versus non-venture funds. The results are presented in Table 8. At least 
for our sample of firms, buyout funds have generally outperformed venture funds. For example, 
over the period 1981-1993, the IRR averages 21.83 percent for buyout funds versus only 14.08 
percent for venture funds. Of course, our sample of venture funds is fairly small as the Limited 
Partner invests disproportionately in buyout funds. Interestingly, Panel B shows that distributions 
occur much more quickly for venture funds (i.e., less negative IRRs a few years out). This is as one 
might suspect, but in our sample venture funds still take longer to break even, consistent with the 
“hit or miss” nature of venture investing.  
The fact that buyout funds outperform venture funds on average is consistent with the higher 
leverage buyout funds typically employ. We will return to leverage shortly. First, however, we ask 
whether the underlying systematic risk faced by these funds is different. In order to answer this 
question, we need to analyze each fund’s portfolio of companies. 
We employ the following three-step procedure to estimate the risk of each private equity fund. 
First, using the information described below, we identify each portfolio company held by a fund. 
Second, given this identification, we assign portfolio companies to one of forty-eight broad industry 
groups chosen by Fama and French (1997). For each of these industries, Fama and French estimate 
an equity beta over a five-year period, 1989-1994. Assuming that the leverage of the private 
company coincides with that of the industry, we then assign the industry beta to the portfolio 
company. Finally, we compute the average equity beta of the fund using the capital disbursements 
as weights. 
For reconstructing the portfolio composition of each fund, we use the following three sources:  
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• Venture Economics: Venture Economics’ “Portfolio Companies (VIPC)” database records 
the holdings of most private equity funds in our dataset, albeit with some error.15  
• Snapshots: In 1999 and 2000, the Limited Partner compiled a snapshot of each fund’s 
portfolio composition, giving the name of the portfolio company and a short verbal 
description of its product, service, or industry, using information provided by the GP in the 
quarterly or annual partnership reports. The snapshots suffer from two shortcomings: (i) they 
do not cover funds liquidated prior to 1999-2000; and (ii) they are based on GP reports as of 
a certain date, so portfolio companies that have been written off are typically not included. 
• Cash flow records: We augment the data with information taken from the cash flow records. 
However, on occasion, a company name is either not disclosed or is abbreviated in such a 
way as to make a positive identification impossible. Moreover, companies may have 
changed their names since first entered in the cash flow records, implying we may overstate 
the number of distinct portfolio companies.  
We eliminate overlap between these sources, taking particular care to trace name changes using 
information provided in Venture Economics, news searches, and annual or quarterly partnership 
reports. 
None of these sources reports SIC codes, so to assign portfolio companies to industries, we 
proceed as follows: 
• In the case of companies that have gone public, or were public prior to being bought out, we 
use their CUSIPs as reported in Venture Economics to identify the primary four-digit SIC 
codes disclosed in S.E.C. filings. 
• We look up all other companies in Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, which 
provides summary information (including primary SIC codes) on approximately 1.6 million 
public and private companies in the U.S. and Canada. To avoid matching with the wrong 
company, we require not only a name match but also that the business description agree with 
Dun & Bradstreet’s SIC code assignment. 
• For companies that we cannot find in D&B, or cannot identify unambiguously, we use the 
verbal business descriptions reported by Venture Economics, and those included in the 
                                                           
15 There are two potential sources of error in the Venture Economics data. First, acquirer stock received as payment in 
the sale of a portfolio company appears as a portfolio investment. Second, and more seriously, Venture Economics 
frequently allocates investments to the wrong fund in a sequence of funds managed by the same general partner (say 
Fund I rather than Fund IV). 
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snapshots compiled by the Limited Partner, to manually assign companies to Fama-French 
industries. We fill gaps using the GPs’ and company web sites and news sources.16  
Table 9, Panel A describes the characteristics of the 73 mature funds’ portfolio companies, 
broken down by buyout versus venture capital fund. Putting systematic risk aside for the moment, 
the table illustrates some important differences between these types of funds. Buyout funds tend to 
invest in far fewer companies than venture funds. For example, the mean and median number of 
companies are respectively 16.1 and 13 for buyout versus 37.3 and 32 for venture funds. Since 
investors can diversify themselves, the lack of diversification on the buyout fund front does not 
seem problematic. Nevertheless, it is an important factor in understanding the heterogeneity of 
returns across funds. In contrast, buyout and venture funds do not differ in the distribution of either 
the fraction of companies or the fraction of capital that is invested in a single, dominant industry. 
Specifically, over one-third of the companies (and 40 percent of the dollar amount) represent 
investments in just one industry. Thus, private equity funds tend to specialize in, or give weight to, 
one industry much more than the average public equity fund. 
Most importantly, Panel A presents the distribution of the funds’ betas using the aforementioned 
designation method. Three observations are in order. First, even though the buyout funds invest in 
relatively few companies, the distribution of their portfolio betas is fairly tight across funds. 
Specifically, their portfolio betas average 1.08, with first and third quartiles of 1.04 and 1.13. Thus, 
it is immediately apparent that the cross-sectional variation of buyout fund returns will not be fully 
explained by their underlying portfolio risk (assuming similar leverage across funds). Second, to the 
extent that buyout funds are more levered than the industries they invest in, these estimates suggest 
beta risk higher than the market. Third, venture funds have only slightly higher systematic risk than 
buyout funds, with betas averaging 1.12 and first and third quartiles of 1.09 and 1.16. Since venture 
funds tend to be less levered than the underlying Fama-French industries (as they invest in younger 
companies), there is some evidence to suggest the higher average returns in the buyout industry may 
partially reflect leverage differences. 
To better understand the relation between a fund’s return and its portfolio risk, we estimate the 
correlation between the fund’s IRR and its portfolio beta (not reported in the table). The correlation 
is generally small. For example, the correlation is 0.01 overall, though this masks an important 
                                                           
16 Due to syndication, some companies appear in the portfolios of more than one GP. Occasionally, the GPs’ product 
descriptions are in conflict and so would lead to different Fama-French assignations. We resolve such conflicts using 
the above sources. 
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difference between venture and non-venture funds: venture fund IRRs correlate negatively with 
portfolio betas (–0.073), while non-venture fund IRRs correlate positively (0.067). When we adjust 
for market returns, the correlation between a fund’s excess IRR and its portfolio beta is –0.149 for 
venture funds and 0.059 for non-venture funds. While the portfolio betas are clearly measured with 
some error, these correlations suggest that cross-sectional variation in fund performance is most 
probably not due to risk differences. Put differently, systematic risk may not be one of the main 
determinants of the cross-section of private equity returns. 
Table 9, Panel B reports risk-adjusted Profitability Indices for the 73 mature funds overall and 
broken down by venture versus buyout fund. Profitability Indices are computed as in Table 7, 
except that we now discount cash inflows at risk-adjusted returns defined as the riskfree rate plus 
the fund’s estimated beta (based on its portfolio of companies) times the risk premium. We use two 
alternative estimates of the risk premium: (i) Fama and French’s (1997) measure (which we denote 
the ex ante cost of capital in the table), and (ii) the mean excess return on the S&P 500 measured 
over the life of the fund (denoted the ex post cost of capital). As before, the riskfree rate is the yield 
to maturity on ten-year treasuries computed in the month the fund was raised.  
Several observations are in order. First, we continue to find that private equity funds create 
excess value. This should not be surprising given that betas aren’t all that high (leverage 
considerations aside). Depending on the risk premium used, the mean Profitability Index is between 
24 percent (ex post) and 32.23 percent (ex ante). Second, these excess values hold for both venture 
and buyout funds, though, in our sample, buyout funds create more value. Third, there is substantial 
cross-sectional variation using these measures of risk-adjusted value creation by private equity 
funds. For example, using the ex post cost of capital, a quarter of the funds are worth at least 46.95 
percent more than the present value of their invested capital, while a quarter lose 27.39 percent or 
more of their invested capital. Thus, risk adjustment does not tighten the dispersion in performance 
across funds. 
Of course, returns on buyout funds may be high simply because such funds tend to be highly 
levered. While we do not have data on the funds’ leverage ratios, we can do back-of-the-envelope 
calculations to better understand the possible impact of leverage. Specifically, we ask: how much 
less equity than the Fama-French industries would the funds have to have had in order for their 
excess value to be zero? Taking the average buyout fund’s IRR of 21.83 percent and assuming the 
riskfree rate is eight percent, the market return is the 14.1 percent return on the S&P index, no taxes, 
a zero liquidity premium, and all debt is riskfree (a conservative assumption), the equity beta at 
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which the average fund breaks even in present-value terms is 2.267. The Fama-French equity beta 
for the average buyout fund in our sample is 1.08. Therefore, buyout funds create excess value as 
long as they don’t use less than 1.08/2.267=0.476 the amount of equity used by the firms in the 
Fama-French industries. For instance, if the debt-equity ratio is 30/70 in the Fama-French data, then 
a fund still creates excess value up to a debt-equity ratio of 66.66/33.34. If debt is not riskfree, then 
the debt-equity ratio consistent with excess returns is even higher. 
 
5.3 The Determinants of Private Equity Returns 
To investigate the determinants of private equity returns, we regress the excess IRRs from Table 
7 on a number of variables.17 By using the excess IRRs, we have by construction adjusted for 
general market movements that match the timing of the funds’ outflows and inflows. The 
explanatory variables we use are fund size (in logs and levels to allow for nonlinearities), a dummy 
for first-time funds, the log of the total amount of capital committed to buyout (venture) funds in the 
year the sample buyout (venture) fund was raised, the portfolio beta, and one of the four measures 
of portfolio diversification reported in Table 9 (the number of portfolio companies, the fraction of 
the portfolio that is invested in the dominant industry, by number and by invested capital, or the 
Herfindahl index of the portfolio weights).18 We include the latter to test Jones and Rhodes-Kropf’s 
(2002) prediction that private equity funds that have more idiosyncratic risk earn higher returns.  
We initially pool venture and buyout funds (a dummy distinguishing them is never significant), 
though we also report results for buyouts separately. The least-squares estimates are presented in 
Table 10. Overall, the explanatory power of the regressions is low, ranging from an adjusted R2 of 
3.7 percent when we use the log of the number of portfolio firms to proxy for idiosyncratic risk to 
5.7 percent when we use the Herfindahl. Excess IRRs increase significantly with the log of real 
fund size and decrease with its level. Using the coefficient estimates, we compute that excess IRRs 
reach a maximum at fund sizes between $1.1 billion and $1.2 billion, depending on the 
specification. If we restrict the estimation sample to buyout funds only, on the other hand, we find 
no significant size effect.  
                                                           
17 The results carry through for the various excess IRR measures as well as the raw IRRs. 
18 Kaplan and Schoar (2002) also look at the determinants of fund performance, measured using the TVPI (the ratio of 
cash distributions and, for unrealized investments, accounting values to total cash invested) as of fund year 5. Unlike us, 
they do find that venture funds perform significantly better than buyout funds. They also control for the sequence 
number of the fund, which we don’t. Their results regarding the effect of fund size and first-time funds are similar to 
ours.  
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First-time funds perform somewhat better than follow-on funds, but the difference is not 
significant. Our measures of idiosyncratic or portfolio risk mostly correlate positively with fund 
returns, but never significantly so.  
One interesting feature of the regression analysis is the difference in the systematic risk 
coefficients in the buyout-only sample (i.e., 0.19) versus in the overall sample (i.e., negative values 
ranging from –0.03 to –0.17). While the estimates are not significantly different from zero, the 
positive relation between portfolio beta and fund returns in the buyout sample is consistent with 
intuition. Economically, however, the effect is small: a one-standard deviation increase in beta 
would lead to only a 0.02 percent increase in the excess IRR on buyout funds. 
Apart from size, the only significant determinant of excess IRRs in our specifications is fund 
inflows: the more money was raised in the fund’s vintage year, the worse is the fund’s subsequent 
performance. This is true both in the overall sample and for buyouts. It is reminiscent of Gompers 
and Lerner’s (2000) finding that inflows into private equity funds increase the prices funds pay for 
their investments. We show that “money chasing deals” tends to lead to lower excess returns. In 
fact, this is the one variable which seems to be a determinant for both buyout funds and venture 
funds. 
 
6. The 1998-2001 Period  
It would be remiss for us not to address the remarkable period of private equity investing 
between 1998 and 2001. As is well documented now, considerable amounts of capital were raised, 
invested, distributed and, most probably, lost during this time. Table 1 shows that, in terms of both 
the number of funds and dollars raised, this four-year period almost matches the previous fifteen 
years. While our Limited Partner is arguably not quite as active as the aggregate industry during this 
period, nevertheless, over 40 percent of all the funds it invested in were raised in 1998-2001. 
Funds that could exit investments before the bubble burst achieved possibly unsustainably good 
returns. Funds that made portfolio investments during that time may have paid excessive valuations 
for companies that are now next to worthless, perhaps because too much capital was being raised 
that ended up “chasing too few deals” (Gompers and Lerner (2000)). 
 Does this mean that the good performance we have documented overstates the expected return 
on private equity? Possibly, but we offer three caveats. First, the differences between our estimates 
of excess private equity returns and those in the existing literature are not due to different treatment 
of this period: neither includes much by the way of late-1990s returns. (Because they are not yet 
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mature, funds raised in 1998-2001 have not been included in our empirical performance estimates.) 
Second, the majority of our results, certainly for the mature funds, refer to the buyout industry 
rather than to venture funds. Buyout funds generally did not invest in the internet sector, so our 
estimates of private equity returns for buyout funds are not necessarily “inflated”. Third, as the 
stock market itself fell beginning in 2000, and the economy went into recession, the relevant 
question is whether the portfolio companies of buyout funds fell in value by more or less than the 
public equity market as whole.  
In order to shed more light on possible differences between recent and older funds, Table 11 
reports draw down schedules (Panel A) and capital return profiles (Panels B and C) separately for 
pre-1998 and post-1998 funds. We also break them down by venture and non-venture funds. 
Consider first the non-venture funds. Note that the draw down rate is somewhat lower in the post-
1998 period: by year four, recently raised funds had invested 61.72 percent of committed capital, 
compared to 72.47 percent for the older funds. At the same time, they had returned invested capital 
a little faster: cumulative distributions after four years average 43.14 percent, as compared to only 
26.29 percent for funds raised pre-1998. To some extent, this is due to less capital having been 
invested in the first place, and so distributions of committed capital are no different. 
Though the sample size is smaller, venture funds follow the same patterns, only more so. That 
is, funds were drawn down at a slower rate and capital was returned more quickly post-1998. Four 
years out, venture funds had invested only 68.47 percent of committed capital versus 82.08 percent 
for the pre-1998 funds, yet had already returned 134.42 percent of invested and 112.81 percent of 
committed capital on average (versus only 35.10 percent and 34.85 percent pre-1998).  
 In sum, recent funds have a slower draw down schedule, both among venture and non-venture 
funds, but they return capital more rapidly, presumably due to the favorable exit climate in the late 
1990s. Such accelerated distributions are particularly evident among venture funds. This is 
consistent with an active IPO market during most of this period which private equity funds took 
advantage of. Taking the capital return numbers by year four as given, recent funds appear to have 
banked much of their returns earlier than usual. Given that the aggregate stock market very nearly 
collapsed beginning in 2000, there is little support for these funds underperforming public equities 
during this time. Of course, funds raised in 2000 and 2001 may be less fortunate, but it is too early 
to assess their performance. 
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7. Final Remarks 
Using a unique dataset of private equity funds raised over the last two decades, we have 
analyzed the cash flow, return, and risk characteristics of private equity. Unlike previous studies, we 
have access to cash flow data that allow us to precisely estimate performance, taking into account 
the exact timing of investment and capital return flows, rather than relying on fund managers’ 
subjective valuations. 
We document several stylized facts that are important for understanding the dynamics of private 
equity investing and performance measurement. The draw down schedules and capital return 
distributions suggest that the timing and illiquidity of the cash flows can be important. For example, 
it takes over three and six years, respectively, to invest 56.9 percent and 90.5 percent of committed 
capital, and over eight and 10 years, respectively, for IRRs to turn positive and eventually exceed 
public equity returns. Moreover, these schedules are not random but depend on the underlying 
conditions of the market (i.e., available investment opportunities) and competition amongst firms 
(i.e., the origination levels of private equity funds). 
 In contrast to recent empirical claims, we document that private equity generates excess returns 
on the order of five to eight percent per annum relative to the aggregate public equity market. These 
excess returns are robust to assumptions about the timing of investments in the public equity 
market, to measures of risk across the portfolio companies, and to various measurement 
methodologies. For example, while we estimate the betas of the private equity funds’ portfolios to 
be greater than one, we show that on a risk-adjusted basis the excess value of the typical private 
equity fund is on the order of 23.8 percent relative to the present value of the invested capital. One 
possible interpretation for this magnitude is that it compensates investors for holding a 10-year 
illiquid investment. A cross-sectional analysis of excess IRRs suggests the source of the 
outperformance is not necessarily compensation for systematic risk, but it may be related to the type 
of fund, such as buyout versus venture, and the timing of the fund (relative to the overall number of 
private equity funds).  
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Table 1. Sample overview 
The sample consists of private equity and venture capital funds raised between 1981 and 2001 (the “vintage years”). 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993 form 
our sample of “mature” funds. To protect the identity of the Limited Partner, we have agreed not to disclose certain characteristics of the funds raised after 1993. VC 
funds are those identified as “venture capital” by Venture Economics. Most non-venture funds are flagged as “Buyout” (90.4 percent); the remainder are flagged as 
“Generalist Private Equity” (3.8 percent), “Mezzanine” (4.8 percent), and “Other Private Equity” (1 percent). Fund size is the capital committed by investors to a 
fund in all closings, as reported by Venture Economics and corrected where needed using partnership reports prepared by the fund managers. Total fund size is the 
aggregate amount raised by all sample funds. Mean fund size is equally weighted. Commitment is the Limited Partner’s capital commitment to the funds. Total 
commitment is the aggregate commitment by the Limited Partner. Mean commitment is equally weighted. All monetary numbers are in nominal U.S. dollars. For 
comparison, we report the number of funds raised according to Venture Economics, for funds headquartered in the same countries as our sample funds (the U.S. and 
certain countries in Europe and Latin America).  
 
 No. of funds Sample size Fraction VC funds Fund Size ($ million, nominal)  Commitment ($ million, nominal)  Mean 
Vintage 
Year 
raised acc. to
Venture
Economics
No. of
funds in
data set 
by
number
(%)
by
fund size
(%) Total Mean Min. Max. Total Mean Min. Max. 
commit-
ment/fund 
size (in %) 
1981 94 1  0.0 0.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.67 
1983 181 2  50.0 75.0 454.6 227.3 113.6 341.0 18.2 9.1 5.6 12.6 4.31 
1984 199 5  40.0 25.7 276.5 55.3 35.0 100.0 14.4 2.9 1.2 5.5 6.10 
1985 185 4  25.0 5.1 724.6 181.2 36.6 400.0 24.1 6.0 2.1 10.5 4.72 
1986 159 6  16.7 51.9 2,265.6 377.6 25.0 1,175.0 36.4 6.1 1.3 10.0 5.40 
1987 198 8  37.5 2.2 6,458.0 807.3 25.0 5,600.0 210.6 26.3 2.0 167.4 5.68 
1988 213 12  8.3 16.0 11,122.9 926.9 100.0 2,200.0 355.5 29.6 8.8 83.0 4.42 
1989 264 11  18.2 5.4 4,108.1 373.5 46.0 1,066.0 190.4 17.3 2.5 99.4 4.05 
1990 236 4  50.0 11.2 1,246.6 311.7 24.3 1,015.5 12.6 3.2 0.8 6.1 2.39 
1992 209 6  33.3 3.3 2,937.8 489.6 15.0 1,020.0 55.0 9.2 2.0 25.0 4.18 
1993 261 14  28.6 4.6 7,033.9 502.4 27.0 1,880.0 184.8 13.2 3.2 40.7 4.59 
1994 304 *  12.5 7.4 8,771.9 * * *  * * * *  * 
1995 408 *  15.4 7.3 7,261.4 * * *  * * * *  * 
1996 439 *  22.2 6.8 15,714.4 * * *  * * * *  * 
1997 655 *  29.4 7.7 19,639.8 * * *  * * * *  * 
1998 800 *  17.1 17.4 36,832.0 * * *  * * * *  * 
1999 1,087 *  20.0 14.3 32,309.2 * * *  * * * *  * 
2000 1,872 *  34.8 22.2 49,314.3 * * *  * * * *  * 
2001 829 *  100.0 100.0 464.6 * * *  * * * *  * 
Total 8,593 *  24.9 14.8 207,011.1 * * *  * * * *  * 
1981-1993 2,199 73 26.0 11.8 36,703.6 502.8 15.0 5,600.0  1,107.0 15.2 0.8 167.4 4.64 
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Table 2. Draw downs and capital returns by vintage year 
When fund managers invest in portfolio companies, they draw down the limited partners’ capital commitment. 
Following liquidity events (such as an IPO), capital is returned to the limited partners in the form of cash or stock 
distributions. In the latter case, the LP may either sell the stock directly or hold it as a public market investment. We 
record only stock distributions that are sold (as virtually all are in our sample). The average fund in our sample has 
drawn down 67.32 percent of committed capital. However, this understates draw downs as the more recent funds in 
the sample are not yet fully invested. Therefore, we also report draw down and distribution schedules for the 59 (73) 
funds raised between 1981 and 1992 (1993).  
 
Vintage 
Year 
No. of 
funds 
Average
draw downs /
committed
capital
Fraction of
funds that are
70% invested
Fraction of
funds that are
80% invested
Average
distributions /
capital invested
Average
distributions /
committed
capital
           
1981 1  0.9991 1.000 1.000 3.2780 3.2751
1983 2  0.8973 1.000 0.500 3.2168 2.9249
1984 5  0.9688 1.000 1.000 3.0794 2.9797
1985 4  1.0112 1.000 1.000 5.1357 5.1416
1986 6  1.0003 1.000 1.000 3.8571 3.8577
1987 8  0.8654 0.750 0.625 2.6453 2.3634
1988 12  0.9780 1.000 1.000 2.0259 1.9661
1989 11  0.9517 1.000 0.909 2.6084 2.4332
1990 4  0.9217 1.000 0.750 1.9637 1.7902
1992 6  0.9027 0.833 0.833 1.8777 1.6396
1993 14  0.9462 1.000 0.929 1.9346 1.7836
1994 *  0.9313 0.938 0.875 1.3123 1.1882
1995 *  0.9101 1.000 0.923 1.2377 1.1478
1996 *  0.9016 0.944 0.889 0.8367 0.7804
1997 *  0.7632 0.618 0.441 0.5130 0.4348
1998 *  0.6511 0.400 0.400 0.5966 0.4377
1999 *  0.4119 0.100 0.025 0.1995 0.0918
2000 *  0.1906 0.000 0.000 0.1187 0.0130
2001 *  0.1831 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.0000
            
1981-2001 *  0.6732 0.556 0.495 1.0683 0.9434
1981-1992 59  0.9477 0.949 0.881 2.7471 2.6102
1981-1993 73  0.9474 0.959 0.890 2.5913 2.4517
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Table 3. Draw downs and capital returns by fund year 
Funds are typically ten-year limited partnerships, with possible extensions by a few years subject to the limited 
partners’ approval. At the end of its life, the general partner “liquidates” the fund by selling all remaining assets and 
distributing the cash to the limited partners. The liquidation phase can potentially take a few years. The table shows 
average annual and cumulative draw downs for each year of a fund’s life, divided by committed capital, and the 
corresponding average cumulative distributions divided by invested and by committed capital. The average fund 
draws down 16.28, 20.35, and 20.15 percent of committed capital in its first three years of operation. At the end of 
its fourth year, it is 72.64 percent invested, and at the end of its expected life (year ten) it is 93.62 percent invested. 
There are no further draw downs beyond year ten. It takes just under seven years for total invested capital to be 
returned in the average fund, and around seven years for committed capital to be returned. There are further capital 
returns beyond year 10, so the last row reports cumulative distributions up to the liquidation date.  
 
Years since 
first closing 
(T) 
Annual draw
downs /
committed
capital
Cumulative
draw downs /
committed
capital,
up to year T
Cumulative
distributions /
total capital
invested,
up to year T
Cumulative
distributions /
capital
committed,
up to year T
    
1 0.1628 0.1628 0.0097 0.0014
2 0.2035 0.3662 0.0372 0.0210
3 0.2015 0.5677 0.1660 0.1292
4 0.1587 0.7264 0.3393 0.2913
5 0.1113 0.8377 0.5370 0.4925
6 0.0622 0.8999 0.8323 0.7688
7 0.0235 0.9234 1.0859 1.0086
8 0.0095 0.9329 1.4433 1.3458
9 0.0050 0.9379 1.8587 1.7456
10 -0.0003 0.9362 2.0663 1.9317
10 or more  0.9362 2.7817 2.6247
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Table 4. The determinants of draw down rates 
The dependent variable is the log of the time (in years) between a fund being raised and it having drawn down at 
least X% of its committed capital. We use three cutoffs for X: 70, 80 and 90 percent. The explanatory variables are 
listed in the table. We estimate accelerated time-to-failure models using maximum likelihood estimators that are 
corrected for the right-censoring caused by funds leaving our sample before they are fully invested. We thus include 
all sample funds raised between 1981 and 2001 in the analysis. The error is assumed to have an exponential 
distribution with mean β0 (the constant). This model is identical to a proportional-hazard duration model, and 
coefficients can easily be converted into hazard ratios. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and 10 percent level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  
 
Time to investing at least … 
 time-varying? 
 70% of 
committed 
capital  
80% of 
committed 
capital  
90% of 
committed 
capital 
       
dummy=1 if venture fund no 0.373  0.478*  0.487* 
  0.259  0.260  0.289 
dummy=1 if first-time fund no -0.021  -0.197  -0.280 
  0.190  0.195  0.214 
dummy=1 if raised in 1981-1993 no -0.612**  -0.904***  -0.668** 
  0.293  0.284  0.282 
log real fund size (in $m) no -0.073  -0.051  0.032 
  0.078  0.086  0.096 
log real fund inflows (in $m), p.a. yes -1.065***  -0.961***  -0.593*** 
  0.193  0.201  0.187 
dummy=1 if year is 1999 or 2000 yes -0.967***  -0.834***  -0.684** 
  0.274  0.291  0.289 
log real fund inflows, same vintage year no 1.735***  1.459***  1.117*** 
  0.201  0.163  0.163 
BAA corporate bond yield, p.a. (in %) yes 0.317***  0.475***  0.342*** 
  0.107  0.120  0.130 
return on S&P 500 index, p.a. yes 0.933  0.915  0.598 
  0.647  0.676  0.695 
constant  -6.597**  -5.932*  -5.401 
  3.194  3.039  3.455 
       
Pseudo-R2  25.3 %  27.7 %  24.0 % 
Likelihood ratio test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2)  121.16***  124.43***  99.86*** 
Number of observations (time at risk)  938  1020  1126 
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Table 5. Fund performance by vintage year 
Internal rates of return are calculated to the earlier of the fund’s maturity or the last data entry (5/31/2001 for most 
funds, 9/30/2002 for some funds). They are based on precisely dated cash flows. Unrealized capital gains (including 
stock distributions held in inventory) or capital losses are ignored. IRRs are net of carried interest and management 
fees and so represent actual returns to the Limited Partner. Funds without positive cash flows are excluded as IRRs 
cannot be computed. The mean IRR is simple weighted. The weighted average IRR is weighted by fund size (as 
defined in Table 1). “Mature” funds are those for which we have at least nine years of data post-first closing. These 
have either been liquidated or are likely to have earned most of their returns already. “Ongoing” funds are younger 
funds that may still earn returns in the future. 
 
    Internal rate of return (in percent) 
Vintage 
Year 
No. of
funds
No. of
funds with
IRR data mean
weighted
average st. dev.
first
quartile median
third
quartile
            
Panel A: Whole sample 
1981-2001 * * -14.59 -30.78 60.25 -56.68 -3.73 18.66
 
Panel B: “Mature” funds 
1981-1993 73 73 19.81 18.13 22.29 9.85 18.66 28.59
1981-1992 59 59 20.46 17.67 22.42 10.60 18.73 28.59
 
1981 1 1 23.43 23.43
1983 2 2 27.82 21.19 18.74 14.57 27.82 41.07
1984 5 5 33.67 32.21 37.72 13.45 16.74 32.52
1985 4 4 33.69 31.19 21.36 22.14 24.43 45.24
1986 6 6 21.54 20.61 10.91 13.27 20.52 26.19
1987 8 8 16.87 7.69 12.10 6.90 18.69 27.10
1988 12 12 12.65 13.55 10.25 9.72 14.13 17.73
1989 11 11 20.38 21.35 12.10 18.09 21.10 28.93
1990 4 4 21.41 24.02 24.75 1.48 17.96 36.18
1992 6 6 16.33 39.48 50.10 15.77 20.04 57.77
1993 14 14 17.08 20.07 22.35 -5.98 12.15 33.41
 
Panel C: “On-going” funds 
1994-2000 * * -34.06 -45.63 66.06 -80.03 -41.58 -0.24
 
1994 * * -1.57 8.92 34.87 -10.60 2.78 20.14
1995 * * -0.24 -8.60 37.53 -26.97 -4.45 26.49
1996 * * -22.14 -48.25 47.77 -58.04 -19.47 8.88
1997 * * -37.85 -32.82 41.30 -65.33 -42.93 -14.21
1998 * * -32.98 -58.84 118.35 -88.72 -52.06 -31.33
1999 * * -69.53 -60.23 28.43 -98.04 -77.45 -41.42
2000 * * -60.72 -55.21 45.82 -98.97 -80.69 2.51
2001 * *
 
  
36 
 
Table 6. Performance by fund year 
Internal rates of return are calculated to the end of year T since the first closing, with T = 1…20 years. Weighted 
averages are based on fund size (total committed capital).  
 
   Internal rate of return (in percent) 
Years since 
first 
closing (T) 
No. of
funds with
IRR data mean
weighted
average st. dev.
first
quartile median
third
quartile
           
1 18 -84.09 -67.81 34.39 -99.87 -97.77 -93.23
2 58 -82.38 -81.34 33.86 -99.23 -95.71 -83.13
3 89 -64.91 -71.97 71.18 -97.70 -86.41 -47.34
4 121 -55.30 -64.58 65.44 -94.07 -72.60 -37.91
5 115 -42.24 -50.74 45.45 -83.81 -48.08 -13.05
6 107 -22.09 -24.86 43.29 -53.80 -20.40 6.29
7 99 -9.18 -14.63 37.23 -27.37 -11.81 13.88
8 83 2.63 -6.48 31.58 -9.26 1.53 17.70
9 68 13.20 4.12 25.93 -1.19 10.03 26.09
10 60 16.54 10.60 25.07 2.68 15.10 28.44
11 50 18.01 11.30 19.32 6.19 16.05 26.03
12 43 18.70 11.59 18.35 9.45 17.46 23.15
13 33 18.74 11.86 18.82 9.70 17.95 23.08
14 25 17.80 11.40 12.78 12.69 18.73 24.88
15 14 17.16 10.43 11.21 12.07 15.61 21.94
16 9 19.66 20.17 9.83 14.24 17.49 22.60
17 4 23.87 20.71 12.02 16.20 19.93 27.61
18 2 32.24 34.04 12.49 27.82 32.24 36.65
20 1 23.43 23.43   
           
10 or more 60 21.39 18.63 22.89 10.40 18.78 30.62
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Table 7. The relative performance of private equity funds 
Panel A reports excess IRRs between private and public equity investments for the 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993. Excess IRRs are measured as the 
fund’s IRR minus the return on a market index under five different assumptions regarding the public-market investment schedule. Panel B reports Profitability 
Index estimates for the 73 funds. The Profitability Index is a measure of the Limited Partner’s return on invested capital, present-valued using various estimates 
of the cost of capital. It is computed as the ratio of the NPV of the fund’s cash flows to the present value of the investment (i.e. the cash outflows or “draw 
downs”); see Brealey and Myers (1996), pp. 101f. All cash outflows are assumed riskfree and so discounted at the riskfree rate. Our estimates are thus 
conservative. Cash inflows are discounted at two different measures of the cost of capital: the annualized return on the S&P 500 or the Nasdaq Composite Index 
between the date the fund was raised and the date the fund matured. Thus, the holding period for the index investment matches the lifespan of the fund.  
 
  Relative to S&P 500 (in %) Relative to Nasdaq Composite (in %) 
   Public equity returns  Mean St.dev.
First
quartile Median
Third
quartile  Mean St.dev.
First 
quartile Median
Third
quartile
             
Panel A: Excess IRRs              
Excess IRRs = Fund IRR – Rm, where Rm is the IRR of …              
… buy index at fund closing, sell at end of year 10  8.06 22.54 -2.34 6.04 15.01 6.28 23.01 -4.16 4.01 13.73
… invest $1 according to the average fund's draw down schedule, 
hold till end of year 10 
 7.17 22.93 -2.51 4.74 15.17 4.78 23.74 -6.34 2.85 11.59
… invest $1 according to the average fund's draw down schedule, 
sell at average index value in year 10 
 7.48 22.69 -2.23 5.63 16.03 5.39 23.11 -5.02 3.32 13.31
… invest $1 according to the fund's actual draw down schedule, 
hold till end of year 10 
 5.71 22.67 -4.21 4.06 13.82 2.63 23.34 -7.24 0.92 9.69
… invest $1 according to the fund's actual draw down schedule, 
sell at average index value in year 10 
 5.93 22.57 -4.49 3.94 14.23 2.62 23.16 -8.90 1.51 8.59
    
Panel B: Profitability Index  25.07 80.65 -23.65 12.18 48.03 9.96 79.39 -39.18 -9.93 38.37
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Table 8. Performance by fund type 
This table breaks down performance by type of fund: venture funds and non-venture funds, as identified in Table 1. Internal rates of return are calculated to the 
end of the fund’s life (in Panel A) or the end of year T since the first closing, with T = 1…20 years (in Panel B). Among funds at or near maturity, non-venture 
funds perform substantially better. As Panel B illustrates, venture funds take about a year longer to break even, suggesting a longer commitment period and later 
exits. 
 
  Venture funds  Non-venture funds 
 Internal rate of return (in percent) Internal rate of return (in percent) 
No. of
funds mean st. dev.
first
quartile median
third
quartile
No. of
funds mean st. dev.
first
quartile median
third
quartile
                   
Panel A: Vintage year              
All years * 1.44 90.54 -56.47 6.61 23.68 * -19.19 47.65 -56.68 -8.02 17.96
1981-1992 15 11.45 26.73 10.06 17.49 24.08 44 23.53 20.18 12.60 19.24 28.76
1981-1993 19 14.08 26.88 6.61 17.49 26.91 54 21.83 20.33 9.97 19.00 27.99
 
Panel B: Years since first closing (T)              
1 2 -30.41 54.66 -49.74 -30.41 -11.08 16 -90.80 26.62 -99.90 -98.64 -94.94
2 7 -60.87 32.95 -77.39 -65.81 -55.29 51 -85.33 33.21 -99.35 -96.56 -86.60
3 13 -22.06 161.47 -95.93 -80.27 -23.34 76 -72.24 37.42 -97.78 -87.22 -48.63
4 25 -27.09 120.82 -85.20 -67.72 -17.73 96 -62.65 38.19 -94.12 -73.66 -41.16
5 28 -36.08 46.83 -81.19 -38.18 -6.81 87 -44.22 45.09 -85.36 -50.87 -13.27
6 27 -28.69 41.38 -55.51 -26.25 -5.22 80 -19.87 43.94 -53.34 -17.90 10.76
7 23 -13.18 37.07 -34.63 -13.16 8.15 76 -7.97 37.44 -24.46 -10.81 14.89
8 21 -9.72 35.37 -33.75 -3.64 7.98 62 6.81 29.33 -8.52 4.73 18.64
9 17 4.63 30.38 -8.19 12.44 28.06 51 16.05 23.93 2.87 10.06 24.46
10 15 5.41 29.19 -4.40 9.22 26.41 45 20.25 22.70 6.18 16.18 29.24
10 or more 15 12.56 27.59 10.06 17.49 26.91 45 24.34 20.61 10.60 19.31 31.96
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Table 9. Portfolio risk and risk-adjusted performance 
Panel A reports measures of portfolio risk for the 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993. We assign portfolio companies to the 48 Fama-French (1997) 
industries (see the text for further information regarding our classification procedure). We report the fraction of the portfolio held in the dominant Fama-French 
industry by number of companies and invested capital. This is a measure of the degree of diversification/concentration of a fund’s portfolio. In addition, we 
compute a Herfindahl index of investment weights by industry. A larger Herfindahl indicates a more concentrated portfolio. Using Fama and French’s five-year 
CAPM estimates of industry betas and industry risk premia (that is, industry betas times the equity risk premium; see their Table 8), we estimate funds’ portfolio 
betas and portfolio risk premia using invested capital as weights. Panel B reports risk-adjusted Profitability Index estimates for the 73 funds. The Profitability 
Index is computed as in Table 7, except that we now discount cash inflows at risk-adjusted returns. The first risk-adjusted return measure is defined as the 
riskfree rate plus the fund’s weighted industry risk premium. The riskfree rate is the yield to maturity on ten-year treasuries computed in the month the fund was 
raised (i.e., there is one riskfree rate per fund). The other risk-adjusted discount rate is defined as the riskfree rate plus the fund’s weighted average Fama-French 
beta times the difference between the index return and the riskfree rate, where the index return is the annualized return on the S&P 500 between the date the fund 
was raised and the date it matured.  
 
 All funds (1981-1993) Venture funds (N=19) Non-venture funds (N=54) 
  Mean St.dev.
First
quartile Median
Third
quartile  Mean St.dev.
First
quartile Median
Third
quartile  Mean St.dev.
First
quartile Median
Third
quartile
            
Panel A: Portfolio risk 
No. of portfolio companies  21.6 21.5 9.0 14.0 26.0 37.3 33.0 12.0 32.0 48.0 16.1 11.7 9.0 13.0 23.0
% of companies in dominant industry 32.07 16.38 18.83 28.57 44.95 32.73 14.99 21.43 29.63 43.90 31.84 16.98 18.75 28.57 45.45
% of invested capital in dominant industry 39.32 20.46 25.62 34.16 47.11 36.94 14.71 23.95 35.99 47.71 40.16 22.19 26.02 32.25 46.11
Portfolio concentration (Herfindahl) 0.280 0.208 0.144 0.225 0.350 0.243 0.142 0.133 0.184 0.392 0.293 0.226 0.151 0.234 0.332
Weighted portfolio betas 1.09 0.10 1.05 1.10 1.14 1.12 0.06 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.08 0.11 1.04 1.09 1.13
Weighted FF industry risk premia (%) 5.55 0.52 5.38 5.63 5.82 5.70 0.31 5.56 5.73 5.93 5.50 0.57 5.32 5.58 5.78
  
Panel B: Risk-adjusted Profitability Index 
Ex ante cost of capital (%) 32.23 83.01 -13.83 17.68 52.26 28.08 80.84 -34.66 20.06 72.77 33.69 84.46 -8.91 16.32 52.26
Ex post cost of capital, S&P 500 (%) 24.00 84.72 -27.39 10.94 46.95 15.11 73.16 -34.98 -1.45 46.29 27.13 88.86 -27.39 12.02 55.05
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Table 10. The determinants of private equity returns 
The dependent variable is excess IRR, measured as the fund’s IRR minus the return on the S&P 500 index 
(assuming  $1 is invested in the index according to the fund’s actual draw down schedule and held till the end of 
year 10). The mean excess return measured this way is 5.71 percent (see Table 7). The results are not qualitatively 
different if we use any of the other excess IRR measures from Table 7, or if we use raw IRRs. The explanatory 
variable are as defined in Tables 4 and 9. The regression is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are shown in 
italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and 10 percent level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
 
 
All mature funds (1981-1993)  Buyout funds 
log real fund size (in $m) 0.099** 0.103***  0.106*** 0.107*** 0.012 
 0.039 0.036  0.036 0.036 0.048 
real fund size (in $bn) -0.084** -0.089**  -0.091** -0.090** -0.021 
 0.042 0.040  0.040 0.040 0.043 
dummy=1 if first-time fund 0.024 0.022  0.017 0.015 -0.037 
 0.064 0.059  0.060 0.060 0.065 
log real fund inflows in vintage year -0.101** -0.093*  -0.098** -0.100** -0.097** 
 0.049 0.047  0.044 0.044 0.046 
weighted portfolio beta -0.167 -0.044  -0.033 -0.046 0.186 
 0.488 0.266  0.260 0.260 0.273 
Portfolio diversification:       
log no. of portfolio companies  -0.007      
 0.037      
% of companies in dominant industry  0.002     
  0.006     
% of invested capital in dominant industry    0.065   
    0.131   
portfolio concentration (Herfindahl)     0.095 0.031 
     0.128 0.132 
constant 0.685 0.430  0.437 0.463 0.750 
 0.657 0.458  0.449 0.446 0.452 
       
Adjusted R2 3.7 % 5.0 %  5.3 % 5.7 % 0.5 % 
Number of observations 73 73  73  73  54 
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Table 11. Draw downs and distributions of recent funds 
The table shows average cumulative draw downs and distributions for each year of a fund’s life T, computed as in Table 
3, for recent (1998-2001) and older (1981-1997) funds. Recent funds have a slower draw down schedule, both among 
venture and non-venture funds, but they return capital more rapidly, presumably due to the favorable exit climate in the 
late 1990s. Such accelerated distributions are particularly evident among venture funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Average cumulative draw downs / committed capital, up to year T
1 0.1477 0.1748 0.1600 0.2379 0.1434 0.1548
2 0.3263 0.3953 0.3356 0.4216 0.3233 0.3870
3 0.5218 0.5885 0.6563 0.6309 0.4906 0.5754
4 0.6295 0.7473 0.6847 0.8208 0.6172 0.7247
Panel B: Average cumulative distributions / total capital invested, up to year T
1 0.0198 0.0017 0.0328 0.0043 0.0153 0.0008
2 0.0616 0.0195 0.0969 0.0230 0.0503 0.0184
3 0.2878 0.1111 0.6339 0.1065 0.2074 0.1125
4 0.5973 0.2836 1.3442 0.3510 0.4314 0.2629
Panel C: Average cumulative distributions / total capital committed, up to year T
1 0.0014 0.0013 0.0021 0.0031 0.0012 0.0008
2 0.0257 0.0176 0.0375 0.0212 0.0220 0.0164
3 0.1891 0.1022 0.5273 0.1050 0.1106 0.1013
4 0.4311 0.2611 1.1281 0.3485 0.2762 0.2343
Years since first 
closing (T ) 1998-2001 1981-1997
Venture funds Non-venture fundsAll funds
1998-2001 1981-1997 1998-2001 1981-1997
